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SUMMARY
US retail food price increases in recent years may seem large in nominal terms,
but after adjusting for inflation have been quite modest even after the change in
US biofuel policies in 2006. In contrast, increases in the real prices of corn, soy-
beans, wheat and rice received by US farmers have been more substantial and can
be linked in part to increases in the real price of oil. That link, however, appears
largely driven by common macroeconomic determinants of the prices of oil and of
agricultural commodities rather than the pass-through from higher oil prices. We
show that there is no evidence that corn ethanol mandates have created a tight link
between oil and agricultural markets. Moreover, increases in agricultural commod-
ity prices have contributed little to US retail food price increases, because of the
small cost share of agricultural products in food prices. In short, there is no evid-
ence that oil price shocks have been associated with more than a negligible increase
in US retail food prices in recent years. Nor is there evidence for the prevailing
wisdom that oil-price driven increases in the cost of food processing, packaging,
transportation and distribution have been responsible for higher retail food prices.
Similar results hold for other industrialized countries. There is reason, however, to
expect food commodity prices to be more tightly linked to retail food prices in
developing countries.
— Christiane Baumeister and Lutz Kilian
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1. INTRODUCTION
The persistent increase in agricultural commodity prices since 2006 has raised con-
cerns among policymakers about a global food shortage and about inflationary pres-
sures. For example, the Financial Times on 23 May 2007, reported that ‘retail food
prices are heading for their biggest annual increase in as much as 30 years, raising
fears that the world faces an unprecedented period of food price inflation’ (see Wig-
gins, 2007). The director of the International Food Policy Research Institute in 2008
testified before the US Congress that rising prices for agricultural crops were causing
food riots in many developing countries, and that, according to the Food and Agricul-
ture Organization of the United Nations, 37 countries were facing food crises (see
Rosegrant, 2008). In 2011, the World Bank predicted that millions more people
would be driven into poverty by higher food prices in the absence of policy changes
(see Inman, 2011). In response to these concerns, the US National Bureau of
Economic Research convened a panel of academic experts in 2012 to study the recent
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increase in food price volatility (see Chavas et al., 2013). Moreover, numerous govern-
ment agencies pondered the causes and policy implications of price volatility in food
and agricultural markets (see, e.g., Interagency Report to the G20, 2011).
There is widespread concern that this global food crisis also has an impact on food
prices in industrialized economies. For example, the Chicago Tribune on 21 February
2008, reported that ‘increases in the price of basic commodities such as grain and milk
have resulted in a tighter squeeze on American families as they face the fastest rise in
food prices in nearly 20 years’. Many news outlets highlighted extraordinary increases
in individual food prices such as a 26% increase in the price of a gallon of whole milk
from January 2007 to January 2008 or a 15% increase in the retail price of bread
from mid-2007 to mid-2008, and local newspapers such as the Sacramento Bee in
California warned that ‘things like hamburger that used to be everyday food are
becoming luxuries’. While these food price increases pale in comparison to those
reported in some developing countries, as documented in Ivanic et al. (2012), this evid-
ence spurred new research on the pass-through from agricultural commodity prices to
the retail price of food in the US (see, e.g., Leibtag, 2009; Berck et al., 2009; Roeger
and Leibtag, 2011).
The worldwide surge in food crop prices in recent years followed a surge in the
price of crude oil, raising the suspicion that oil and food crop prices have become
more closely linked in recent years (see, e.g., Tyner, 2010). Mallory et al. (2012) pro-
vide evidence that this link was strengthened by the increased reliance on biofuels in
industrialized economies, notably in the United States. The United States had pur-
sued policies favouring the production of ethanol from corn for a long time, but a fur-
ther shift in US policy occurred in 2005 when policymakers refrained from providing
liability waivers for the use of the environmentally harmful gasoline additives tradi-
tionally used in producing high octane fuels.1 This decision effectively made ethanol
produced from corn the only gasoline additive available to US gasoline producers
after May 2006. This shift in US policy was followed by the introduction of renewable
fuel standards mandating the use of ethanol in the production of gasoline.2 It was also
followed by a surge in the price of corn and other crops, often collectively referred to
as food commodities.
Similar policy changes also took place in many other industrialized countries, but
typically at a later stage. For example, the European Union introduced in 2003 a bio-
fuel target of 5.75% for renewable fuels to be used for transport fuels. This target ini-
tially was voluntary, however. It was replaced by a mandatory 10% renewable
transport fuels target only in 2009. Another difference is that in Europe biodiesel is
the main biofuel for transport. Ethanol accounts for only 28% of the biofuel market.
1 Corn in American English is maize in British English. We follow the American usage, given that our
data are obtained from the US Department of Agriculture.
2 For a detailed review of the legislative process culminating in US biofuel mandates see Anderson and El-
zinga (2014), Carter et al. (2013), and Abbott (2013).
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European biofuels are produced mainly from rapeseed, sugar beets and cereals.
Domestic production is supplemented by imports of ethanol and biodiesel initially
mainly from the United States and increasingly from Latin America.
Many observers agree that oil prices affect food prices in a variety of ways (see, e.g.,
Westhoff, 2012). Some have gone as far as claiming that ‘food prices mirror oil prices’
(see Dancy, 2012). While the latter position does not seem tenable, there are good reas-
ons to suspect a causal link. For example, corn is used both as food and as a raw mater-
ial in producing ethanol. To the extent that the latter competes with crude oil in
producing refined products such as gasoline and diesel, all else equal, one would expect
higher oil prices to be reflected in higher corn prices. In addition, corn is also used to
feed farm animals. The resulting increases in the cost of producing meat and dairy prod-
ucts puts upward pressure on meat and dairy prices. Moreover, corn competes with
other agricultural commodities for fertilizer and for scarce water and land resources,
adding to the pressure on food prices. Finally, the prices of all agricultural products will
be affected to the extent that diesel is used to power mechanized farm equipment.
In fact, corn is but one example of a food commodity, the price of which is directly
linked to the price of crude oil. Additional examples include sugar cane, which may
be used to produce ethanol or food, soybeans which may be used to produce biodiesel
or food, other oil seeds which may be used to produce vegetable oil or biodiesel, and
grains which may be used to produce cereals or for heating buildings.
The potential price pressures from rising oil prices are not limited to the production
stage of food commodities. Higher energy costs may also raise the cost of food process-
ing, food packaging and distribution. In particular, the cost of transportation is a
potentially important component of the price of food, as is the cost of producing plas-
tic and foam packaging.
The objective of this paper is to examine what the evidence is for a link from oil
prices to food prices. We are not the first to raise this question. There is a rapidly grow-
ing literature using time series data to study the link between oil prices, agricultural
commodity prices and food prices. The modelling techniques used and the main con-
clusions reached in this literature have been reviewed by Serra and Zilberman (2013).
Much of this literature is based on atheoretical time series models that are inherently
incapable of establishing or quantifying causal links in the data.3 Hence, claims in this
literature about how oil prices ‘impact’, ‘influence’, ‘feed back to’ or ‘drive’ food prices
must be discounted. What these studies document at best is that oil prices increased
prior to food prices in recent years, but that observation is uncontroversial.
What is needed to quantify causal relationships between the price of oil and crop
and food prices is a structural econometric framework that acknowledges the
underlying identification problem. One concern is that there is not only causality
3 Examples are the use of so-called Granger non-causality tests as a means of establishing causality and
the use of reduced-form VAR impulse responses or the interpretation of the coefficients of reduced-form
vector error correction models or vector autoregressive models as measures of causal impact.
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running from oil prices to food prices, but also causality running in the other direc-
tion. A case in point is the dramatic shift toward more mechanized agricultural
production in China in recent years. For example, the use of tractors (excluding
small tractors) in China increased by 20% in 2006, by 23% in 2007 and by 46%
in 2008. The reasons include a shortage of unskilled labour, as workers migrate to
cities; higher farm incomes which facilitate the purchase of machinery; and govern-
ment subsidies for agricultural equipment. Such an expansion of agricultural activ-
ity involves a shift in the global demand for crude oil, invalidating the premise of
one-way causality from the price of crude oil to agricultural commodity prices.
A second concern is that, even abstracting from reverse causality in agricultural
commodity markets, the oil price increases after 2003 did not occur in isolation, but
were the result of changes in the global economy. Thus we cannot treat these oil price
increases as though they occurred all else equal, as many existing studies explicitly or
implicitly do. An example illustrates this point. It has been shown that much of the
surge in oil prices between 2003 and mid-2008 was associated with an unexpectedly
booming world economy, notably in emerging Asia (see, e.g., Kilian and Hicks, 2013;
Kilian and Murphy, 2014). This economic expansion was also associated with higher
incomes in countries such as China, which caused higher demand for food in general
and higher global demand for high-quality foods in particular including wine, meat
and dairy products, for example. This shift in demand for food products in turn has
affected the demand for agricultural commodities such as corn. For example, the US
Grains Council reported in 2013 that for the first time in history China is set to pro-
duce more corn than rice, reflecting a new pattern of demand. Thus, observed
increases in food commodity prices are by no means attributable to the increase in the
price of oil alone. Put differently, if the same increase in the real price of oil had been
caused by oil supply disruptions in the Middle East, the response of food crop prices
would have been quite different. Moreover, the precise causes of the observed surge
in the real price of oil matter for the persistence of the response of oil and food prices.
A third concern is that the pass-through from oil prices to food prices depends on
the reaction of the domestic central bank, as stressed by Hamilton (2012), making it
more difficult to isolate empirically what is unique about the response of food prices.
The econometric analysis in this paper is designed to help us quantify many of the
relevant channels of transmission in question, keeping in mind the complications dis-
cussed above. Our approach complements recent work in the resource economics lit-
erature that uses structural dynamic econometric models to quantify the effects of
biofuel policies on agricultural commodity prices with notable contributions by Haus-
man et al. (2012) and Carter et al. (2013). Their estimates of the effects of biofuel
policies on crop prices range from less than 10% to 34%.4 In contrast, our work is not
4 Closely related work includes the comparative statics analysis of the effects of the 2009 Renewable Fuels
Standard in Roberts and Schlenker (2013) by means of a structural model of major agricultural commod-
ity markets.
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concerned with the effects of these policies as such, but with understanding the
dynamic relationship between oil prices, agricultural prices, and ultimately food
prices, especially after the change in US biofuel policies in 2006.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the salient
data and highlights the facts to be explained. Section 3 shows how case studies may be
used to gauge the impact of oil price shocks on food prices, while controlling for
changes in global real economic activity. Section 4 examines the evidence for a struc-
tural break in the relationship between oil and food prices in May of 2006, when US
policy toward ethanol changed with the implementation of the Energy Policy Act of
2005, which established a closer link between oil prices and corn prices. The main
results are in Section 5, which attempts to gauge the quantitative importance of each
of the main channels of transmission from oil price shocks to food prices. We distin-
guish in particular between the effect of real oil price shocks on the prices paid and
received by US farmers on the one hand and their effect on the cost of marketing food
to retail customers in the US on the other. Section 6 distinguishes between common
and idiosyncratic determinants of global agricultural commodity prices and discusses
implications of our evidence for industrialized and for developing economies. The
concluding remarks are in Section 7.
2. FACTS ABOUT FOOD PRICES
Consumers tend to be aware of rising food prices more than rising prices for other
goods with the possible exception of gasoline because food items are purchased on a
regular basis. Figure 1 plots the cumulative per cent growth in US consumer prices
since May 2006 for all food items in the aggregate as well as for the four most import-
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Figure 1. Cumulative percentage growth in US consumer prices for food since
May 2006
Notes: Authors’ computations based on the data described in the appendix.
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ant components of food consumed at home. It shows that overall food prices have
increased by 20% in only seven years. The price of cereals and baked goods increased
even faster at a rate of almost 25%, with the price of meats, poultry, fish and eggs
close behind. The consumer price of the remaining items grew at a slower pace, but
even the price of fruits and vegetables rose by 15% in only seven years.
This evidence confirms the impression that indeed food prices have been rising per-
sistently in recent years. Of course, so have all prices. In fact, in a country with a mod-
erate 2% rate of inflation one would expect all prices to increase by about 15% in
seven years. Thus, the real question is whether food prices have increased more than
other consumer prices. Figure 2 addresses this question by expressing the food prices
underlying Figure 1 relative to an index of US consumer prices excluding food. This
transformation results in a measure of the real price of food that conveys how much
consumers have to give up in terms of other consumer goods to purchase these food
items. Figure 2 illustrates that overall the real price of food has increased by only 7%
since May 2006. This means that a household spending $1,000 a month on food
would have had to cut back other expenditures by $70, provided that it cannot econom-
ize its expenditures by changing the composition of its food purchases or by reducing
its overall food purchases. This aggregate result hides the fact that the price of some
food items such as fruits and vegetables hardly changed, while others such as cereals and
baked goods or meats, poultry, fish, and eggs experienced double digit per cent price
increases in real terms, but it is nevertheless representative for the overall impact of
food price inflation on retail consumers.
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Figure 2. US consumer food prices relative to non-food consumer prices,
2006:5–2013:5
Notes: Authors’ computations based on the data described in the appendix.
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2.1. Food price increases in historical perspective
The evidence in Figure 2 raises several questions. One question is how these price
increases compare with historical experience. Another important question is how the
prices faced by consumers compare with the prices paid and received by US farmers
and how they compare with the price of crude oil and oil products such as diesel fuel.
Table 1 provides a systematic comparison. It focuses on the price of crude oil and
diesel fuel, the price paid by US farmers for agricultural inputs such as fuel, fertilizer,
and animal feed, the price received by US farmers for key agricultural products such
as corn, wheat, soybeans and rice, and for livestock such as cattle, hogs, broilers and
turkeys, and finally the price paid by US consumers for food. The prices received by
US farmers typically closely mirror the spot prices quoted on commodity exchanges
and reported by the International Monetary Fund. The data sources are described in
the appendix. All prices in Table 1 have again been expressed in real terms by normal-
izing them relative to the index of US consumer prices excluding food items. Table 1
contrasts the experience from January 1974 until April 2006 with that since May 2006.
Table 1 reveals some striking contrasts. Whereas prior to May 2006 real retail food
prices overall had been declining at the rate of 0.6% per year, they increased on aver-
age by 0.9% per year after May 2006. At the same time, the rate of growth in the real
price of crude oil accelerated from 1.2% on average prior to May 2006 to 4.2% on
average after May 2006. This evidence raises the question of whether there might be
a relationship, as conjectured by many observers.
Interestingly, the perhaps more relevant increase in the real price of diesel fuel after
May 2006 was only 2.2% per year on average, which is reflected in a 2.5% per year
increase in farmer’s fuel costs. By comparison, the real price of fertilizer increased
much more than the real price of crude oil, as did the real price of animal feed. This
pattern appears consistent with a shift in the demand for agricultural products and
possibly with a shift in the composition of agricultural products after May 2006 and
with an expansion into marginal farm land. Likewise, the real price increases for corn
and soybeans and to a lesser extent for wheat and rice far exceed the increases in the
real price of crude oil and farm fuel. These increases are all the more striking com-
pared with the systematic declines characteristic of previous decades. The correspond-
ing increases in the real price of livestock tend to be more modest, but again are
striking in historical comparison.
The increases in the real price received by farmers for products such as corn,
wheat, soybeans and rice can be reconciled with the modest increases in the real
price of food after May 2006 by observing that these farm products account for only
a small fraction of the retail cost of food products. Overall, agricultural products
account for less than 20% of the cost of food to consumers, with the remainder
accounted for by the cost of processing, packaging, advertising, transporting and dis-
tributing food to retail markets. For example, the share of livestock prices in the cost
of meat to consumers may be as high as 50%, while the share of wheat in the cost of
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bread historically has been only about 5%.5 This means that all else equal a doubling
of the price of wheat will be associated with only a 5% increase in the price of
bread.
To summarize, what Table 1 conveys is that there is no evidence of a tight statist-
ical relationship between oil prices and US retail food prices, contradicting Dancy’s
(2012) claim that food prices mirror oil prices. Figure 3 illustrates the lack of fit.
Whereas the real price of oil fluctuates within +100% and 100% of its long-run
mean, the real price of food remains within a few percentage points of its mean. Not
only are the magnitudes quite different, but the probability that the price of food
increases when the price of oil increases is less than 47%, indicating the absence of a
systematic relationship. Moreover, there is no evidence that the fit improves after
May 2006.
Table 1 shows a stronger statistical relationship between oil prices and the grain
crop prices received by US farmers, in contrast. The reasons will be examined in
detail further below. For now, it is useful to examine the degree of comovement of
agricultural product and oil prices and the extent to which this comovement has
strengthened in recent years. Figure 4a compares the evolution of the real price of
corn, wheat and soybeans prior to May 2006 with that of the real price of oil. We
exclude the real price of rice because of its lesser importance for US agriculture and
because one would not expect it to be linked as tightly to oil as some of the other grain
prices. Whereas real agricultural product prices show comparatively small variation
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Figure 3. Price of crude oil and US food consumer price index relative to US
non-food CPI, 1974:1–2013:5
Notes: Authors’ computations based on the data described in the appendix.
5 Detailed information about the farm value shares for selected food products are provided by the Eco-
nomic Research Service of the US Department of Agriculture (http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/
price-spreads-from-farm-to-consumer.aspx)
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about a declining trend, the real price of oil exhibits much larger variation about its
long-run mean with no indication of a long-run trend. Figure 4b shows that the secu-
lar decline in the agricultural product prices is reversed after May 2006 and the co-
movement between the real price of oil and real agricultural product prices becomes
more pronounced. This comovement, however, remains far from perfect.
There are several potential explanations of this evidence. One possible explanation
is that the increased comovement reflects increased demand for oil associated with an
economic boom in emerging economies, followed by rising real incomes in emerging
economies and higher demand for agricultural products worldwide. Another potential
explanation is that higher oil prices are associated with increased prices for agricultural
inputs that drive up crop prices. A third and complementary potential explanation is
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Figure 4. Real prices received by US farmers and real price of crude oil:
(a) 1974:1–2006:4; (b) 2006:5–2013:5
Notes: Authors’ computations based on the data described in the appendix.
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that US agricultural policies created a tighter link from oil prices to agricultural prod-
uct prices. Finally, yet another possible explanation is the financialization of global
commodity markets after 2003. Kilian and Murphy (2014), Kilian and Lee (2014), and
Fattouh et al. (2013) show that this last explanation is not supported by the oil market
data, making it implausible that it would apply to other commodity markets and allow-
ing us to focus primarily on the first three explanations. For related evidence on the
role of financial speculation in the wheat market we refer to Janzen et al. (2014).
2.2. Has the volatility of the real price of food increased?
As discussed in the introduction, the premise of much of the policy debate has been
that the volatility of food prices is said to have increased since the shift in US biofuel
policies. This fact is usually taken as self-evident. While several studies have reported
evidence of rising food price volatility, that evidence in many cases is problematic
from a statistical point of view.6 Table 1 illustrates that the premise of rising food
price volatility is difficult to sustain. The last column of Table 1 presents the per cent
change in the volatility of the monthly growth rates in period (a), referring to January
1974 to April 2006, and period (b), referring to May 2006 to May 2013. For example,
the volatility of the growth rate of the real price of oil increased by 31%. This increase
reflects the sharp drop in oil prices in late 2008, following the financial crisis. There is
no indication of increased volatility beyond this one episode.
If there were a close link from oil to food prices, one would expect a similar increase
in the volatility of agricultural crop prices. However, only the growth rate of wheat
prices shows a similar increase in volatility, whereas that of corn prices increases by
only 10%, that of soybeans actually falls by 5% and that of rice falls by 30%. This evid-
ence argues against the view that price volatility in food commodities has risen system-
atically. Moreover, comparing wheat and corn in particular shows that the smaller
volatility increases apply to the growth in the real price of corn which, according to
conventional wisdom, should be most exposed to higher oil price volatility.
Likewise, with the exception of live turkeys, there is no evidence of an increase in
the volatility of livestock prices. In fact, the price volatility for cattle declined by 10%
and that for hogs declined by 15%, again contradicting conventional wisdom. Finally,
although the volatility of the growth rate of the real price of consumer food increased,
it did so only by 10% compared with the 31% increase for crude oil. Volatility
changes for components of the real food price index range from 44% to 16% with
the exception of food away from home with a 70% volatility increase. This evidence is
not supportive of a general increase in the volatility of retail food prices or of a spill-
over from oil price volatility to price volatility in agricultural markets.
6 For example, it is common to focus on nominal rather than real prices, to compute variances of non-sta-
tionary time series, and to report correlations of trending data.
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Rather than relying on summary statistics, Figure 5 plots the per cent growth rates
of the real price of oil, the real price of corn, and the real consumer price index (CPI)
for food. To facilitate visual comparison we show the data for exactly seven years
before and after May 2006. One would be hard pressed to detect visually a substantial
shift in volatility in May 2006 for any of these time series. Although there is an unusu-
ally large positive spike in consumer food prices in late 2008, this spike is offset by
lower volatility in subsequent years. This plot should put to rest the popular view that
there has been a substantial increase in food price volatility in recent years. It is also
noteworthy that the positive spike in the growth rate of real retail food prices coincides
with a negative spike in the growth rate of real price of oil, but no large spike in either
direction in the growth rate of the real price of corn.
2.3. Has the correlation in the growth rates of the real prices of food and oil
increased?
A closely related position in the literature is that the positive correlation between per
cent changes in oil prices on the one hand and in agricultural commodity prices and
retail food prices on the other has increased in recent years (see, e.g., Interagency
Report to the G20, 2011, p. 10). Table 1 shows that prior to May 2006 the contempor-
aneous correlation between the growth rate in the real price of crude oil and the
growth rate in real agricultural crop prices ranged from 0.03 to 0.09. After May
2006, we find correlations ranging from 0.1 to 0.3 between the real price of oil and
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Figure 5. Percentage growth rates of selected prices before and after May 2006:
(a) 1999:5–2006:4; (b) 2006:6–2013:5
Notes: Authors’ computations based on the data described in the appendix.
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the real price of crops. To put these results in perspective, it is useful to compare these
correlations with those between the growth rate in the real price of oil and the growth
rate in the real prices farmers pay for fuel, fertilizer and animal feed. While the cor-
relation of 0.85 for fuel matches that of diesel fuel, as expected, the correlations of 0.3
for animal feed and 0.12 for fertilizer are much more modest, arguing against a tight
statistical link. Similar results apply to the growth rate in the real price of livestock
whose various correlations with the growth rate in the real price of oil range from
0.02 to 0.06 before May 2006 and between 0.03 and 0.26 after May 2006. Neither
set of results provides strong evidence for a tight statistical link between changes in the
real price of oil and in real agricultural prices.
Turning to the real retail price of food in Table 1, the results are even weaker. Prior
to May 2006, the contemporaneous correlation between the growth rate in the real
price of food and that in the real price of oil was 0.13, meaning that there was essen-
tially no linear relation. After May 2006 this correlation falls to 0.74. In short, there
is no support for the popular notion of a tight statistical link between increases in the
real price of oil and increases in the real price of food. Of course, the absence of a
positive contemporaneous correlation does not rule out the existence of a conditional
correlation between these real prices such that an unexpected increase in the real
price of oil is followed by a delayed positive response of the real price of food. This
separate question will be examined in detail in section 5.
3. A CASE STUDY APPROACH
Given that both the real price of oil and the real price of agricultural products are
endogenous with respect to the global economy, one cannot interpret the comove-
ment of food and oil prices as evidence of a causal relationship. One potential solution
to this problem would be to instrument for oil prices using oil supply shocks associated
with unrelated political events in the Middle East. The objective of the use of these
instruments is to isolate the component of the real price of oil that is not associated
with unanticipated fluctuations in the global business cycle. The problem is that exist-
ing oil supply shock instruments are weak in the statistical sense. Their lack of predict-
ive power for the real price of oil invalidates the use of conventional instrumental
variable estimators (see Kilian, 2008a, b).
An alternative approach is to rely on case studies. Of particular interest is the sharp
spike in oil prices that occurred after July 1990, when Saddam Hussein invaded
Kuwait. It is well established that this major oil price spike was driven by oil supply
disruptions and by concerns among oil market participants about pending additional
oil supply shortfalls in case the war were to engulf Saudi Arabia. Put differently, this
oil price spike was clearly not related to the strength of the global business cycle (see,
e.g., Kilian and Murphy, 2014). This means that we can think of this variation in the
real price of oil as exogenous with respect to US agricultural product markets.
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If there is a relationship between oil prices and agricultural prices because higher
prices for oil-intensive agricultural inputs push up the price of agricultural product
prices, then this is the historical episode where we would expect to see a reaction in
the cost of farm inputs such as fuel and animal feed as well as in agricultural product
prices. Figure 6a clearly shows a spike in the real price of oil in 1990, but no apparent
response of real corn, wheat or soybean prices, demonstrating that there is no tight
causal link between oil prices and agricultural commodity prices at least prior to May
2006. This finding is reinforced in Figure 6b which shows that only fuel prices, but
not fertilizer or animal feed prices responded to this exogenous oil price shock. This
evidence means that proponents of such a causal link have to make the case that this
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Figure 6. Case study of (a) farm crop prices and (b) farm input prices during
1990
Notes: Authors’ computations based on the data described in the appendix.
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link emerged only in recent years. A natural candidate for such a structural shift is
changes in US biofuel policies.
4. WHAT IS THE EVIDENCE FOR A STRUCTURAL BREAK RELATED TO
INCREASED ETHANOL PRODUCTION?
Even though the evidence in Figure 4a shows that there has been no obvious link
between oil and food prices historically, we have to allow for the possibility that the
expansion of biofuel production after May 2006 has changed the link between oil and
food prices in recent years. US ethanol policies go back more than 30 years, but an
important change in US policy took place with the passing of the Energy Policy Act
2005. At the time, it was standard for gasoline producers to add organic compounds
such as methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) or ethanol to the gasoline produced by
refineries to raise its octane rating to levels suitable for car engines. As discussed in
Anderson and Elzinga (2014), these compounds also served as oxygenates that reduce
the emissions of carbon monoxide, as required by the US Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA). Finally, in cities with particularly poor air quality, the EPA mandated
that only reformulated gasoline be sold which involves blending gasoline with either
MTBE or ethanol.
In the late 1990s, MTBE was linked to the pollution of drinking water, prompting a
number of US states to ban its use after 2000. These bans effectively served as ethanol
mandates at the state level, as shown in Anderson and Elzinga (2014), given that eth-
anol was the only available alternative means of satisfying the oxygenation require-
ment and of raising octane levels. Meanwhile oil companies sought legal protection
from MTBE-related lawsuits. When the Energy Policy Act 2005 failed to grant a
liability waiver for the use of MTBE in states not already subject to MTBE bans, gaso-
line producers chose to phase out MTBE completely. This decision had far-reaching
implications for the price of corn, from which ethanol is primarily produced in the
US. For example, Carter et al. (2013) report that, by 2012, 40% of US corn produc-
tion was used to produce gasoline additives, up from only 14% in 2005.
In addition, Congress passed the Renewable Fuels Standard in 2005, which
ensured a minimum demand for ethanol and contained additional provisions aimed
at subsidizing ethanol production by offering tax credits and imposing import tariffs
on ethanol. The latter provisions were dismantled only in 2011 and 2012. The
required minimum levels of ethanol production were doubled by the Energy Independ-
ence and Security Act 2007. Legislation regarding the use of ethanol continues to
evolve. In 2015, the minimum on annual corn ethanol production is set to rise further
to 15 billion gallons compared with 4 billion gallons in 2006 (see Carter et al., 2013).
Whereas initially environmental concerns were driving biofuels legislation, policymak-
ers’ motives have evolved over time to include concerns about energy security and
pressures from the agricultural lobby.
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We treat May 2006 as the date of a tentative structural break in the relationship
between oil, agricultural, and food prices. There is no universal agreement on this
date in the literature, but most observers agree that between late 2005 and late 2006
the link between crop prices and oil prices changed. For example, Carter et al. (2013)
note that informed market participants would have been well aware by late 2006 of
the impending boom in ethanol production, and Mallory et al. (2012) document a
change in the statistical relationship between corn and ethanol futures prices begin-
ning in mid-2006.
Figure 7a shows the per cent deviation of the real price of oil from the real price of
corn. There is little evidence of a mean-reverting statistical relationship, as one would
expect, given the secular decline in corn prices. This concern may be addressed by
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Figure 7. Spread of price of oil to price of corn received by US farmers: (a)
1974:1–2006:4; (b) 2006:5–2013:5
Notes: Authors’ computations based on the data described in the appendix.
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removing a deterministic time trend from the spread between January 1974 and April
2006, as shown in Figure 7a, but visual inspection suggests that even in the latter case
a common trend, if indeed such a trend exists, must be very weak given repeated sub-
stantial and persistent deviations from trend. When fitting a common trend to oil and
corn prices since May 2006, as shown in Figure 7b, in contrast, the deviations from
the long-run mean appear somewhat smaller and less noisy. One way of making these
impressions more formal is to compute measures of the directional accuracy of
changes in the real price of oil for changes in the real price of corn. It can be shown
that prior to May 2006 the probability that the price of oil and the price of corn move
in the same direction is only 51%, where 50% is the benchmark value of this probabil-
ity in the absence of a systematic relationship. After May 2006, in contrast, this prob-
ability rises to 60% and becomes statistically distinguishable at the 10% level from the
hypothesis of purely random comovement.7
One possible source of this comovement after 2006 is a link between the real price
of oil and that of agricultural inputs. Figure 8 suggests a tight link between the real
price of diesel fuel and the real price of fuel paid by US farmers. There is also a some-
what less tight statistical link between the real price of oil and the real price of fertil-
izer. Finally, there is an even weaker link between the real price of oil and the real
price of animal feed. This evidence of a statistical relationship after May 2006 is con-
sistent with the hypothesis of higher demand for agricultural products from emerging
economies as well as explanations based on a shift in US agricultural policy.
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Figure 8. Real price of energy and real price of US farm inputs, 2006:5–2013:5
Notes: Authors’ computations based on the data described in the appendix.
7 This assessment is based on the statistical test for directional accuracy proposed in Pesaran and Timmer-
mann (2009).
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To conclude, there is at least some evidence of nonrandom comovement after May
2006 between the real price of crude oil and the real price of corn on the one hand,
and between the real price of oil and the real price of agricultural inputs such as fuel,
fertilizer and to a lesser extent animal feed on the other. The next section attempts to
disentangle the channels of transmission from the real price of oil to raw agricultural
product prices and ultimately retail food prices in more detail, taking account of the
three potential explanations of such a link outlined earlier. Our focus is on responses
to real oil price shocks obtained from semi-structural vector autoregressive (VAR)
models rather than the unconditional comovement in the data. These models differ
from atheoretical time series models in that they impose additional identifying restric-
tions motivated by economic reasoning and extraneous empirical evidence. Within
this VAR framework, the response of food prices to real oil price shocks may be inter-
preted as the revision in the expected price of food triggered by an oil price shock.
This revision reflects the average relationship between food prices and oil prices in the
data. As discussed in Section 6, these responses do not necessarily represent causal
effects, because oil price shocks do not occur in isolation and are driven by deeper
structural demand and supply shocks. Nevertheless, semi-structural VAR models help
us characterize and understand the dynamic relationship between oil and food prices.
5. QUANTIFYING THE CHANNELS OF TRANSMISSION
One way of trying to make sense of the many different potential channels of transmis-
sion is to break the analysis into many smaller questions. This section examines and
quantifies various links in the chain from oil to food prices. Our baseline results are
based on bivariate autoregressions.8 Throughout the paper, the VAR models are
specified in log-levels. We use six lags to avoid well-known problems of post-model
selection inference. Our empirical results tend to be qualitatively robust to using 12
lags and to the treatment of seasonality.9 All models include an intercept and are
estimated by the method of unrestricted least squares.
8 A potential concern in studying the pass-through of oil prices to diesel fuel prices and ultimately to food
prices is a possible asymmetry in the relationship between oil and fuel prices. There is a long-standing per-
ception that oil price increases are followed by immediate increases in fuel prices, while oil price declines
are transmitted to fuel prices only with a delay. Whether this perception is supported by the data continues
to be debated. The evidence appears to be stronger in data at daily or weekly frequency than at monthly
frequency. Building on methodological advances on Kilian and Vigfusson (2011), Venditti (2013) recently
has shown that in monthly data there is no statistically significant evidence that fuel prices respond asym-
metrically to positive and negative oil price shocks. We therefore ignore possible asymmetries in our ana-
lysis.
9 This level specification is chosen to ensure consistency of the estimates regardless of the possible cointeg-
ration of the model variables (see Sims et al., 1990; Inoue and Kilian, 2002). Our approach also avoids the
well-known problems associated with pre-tests for unit roots and cointegration in VAR models (see Elliott,
1998). The superior accuracy of the log-levels approach in small samples has recently been demonstrated
in Gospodinov et al. (2013).
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We postulate that the monthly real price of crude oil is predetermined with respect
to US agricultural and food prices, which allows us to study the response of the latter
prices to oil price shocks using semi-structural vector autoregressions.10 The assump-
tion of predetermined oil prices means that unpredictable changes in the real price of
oil affect agricultural and food prices within the current month, but are not themselves
subject to instantaneous feedback from agricultural and food prices. Given the low
volatility of consumer prices relative to the nominal price of oil, the feedback from
consumer prices to the real price of oil may be safely ignored in the identification of
oil price shocks.11
It is important to note that our sample sizes are too short for any model larger than
a bivariate model to be employed. For example, the fully structural VAR approach of
McPhail (2011), which in turn builds on Kilian (2010), would be infeasible on data
since May 2006. Our approach is also designed to avoid the difficulty of credibly iden-
tifying additional shocks in structural VAR models including more than one food or
crop price.
5.1. Quantifying the pass-through from oil prices to food prices
In discussing the relationship of oil and food prices, a natural starting point is the
question of what the pass-through is of unanticipated changes in the real price of oil
to the real price of food paid by US consumers. We address this question by fitting the
VAR model
p
crude=CPI
t
p
food CPI=CPI ex food
t
 !
VARð6Þ
where pt denotes any real price expressed in logs and 6 refers to the number of autore-
gressive lags. The real price of oil is measured in terms of the overall US consumer
price index, given that crude oil is not part of the consumption basket. The real price of
food is measured relative to the CPI excluding food. This fact allows us to abstract from
any general inflationary effects associated with oil price shocks and to focus on the per-
ception that the response of food prices is unusual. One of the concerns in measuring
the pass-through from oil prices to consumer prices, recently reiterated by Hamilton
(2012), is that the extent of the pass-through depends on the response of the central
bank to the inflationary pressures often associated with an oil price shock. By expressing
the consumer price of food relative to other consumer prices, we effectively control for
this monetary policy response which affects all consumer prices across the board.
10 To conserve space, in the analysis below, we do not display the own-responses of the real price of oil. It
can be shown that these responses are very similar across alternative model specifications for any given
sample period.
11 Our approach is consistent with evidence in Kilian and Vega (2011) on the lack of instantaneous feed-
back from news about US macroeconomic aggregates to the price of oil and to the price of gasoline and
has been widely used in the literature in related contexts (see, e.g., Edelstein and Kilian, 2009).
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When plotting the results, we scale the responses, so that oil price shocks are associ-
ated with an unanticipated 1% increase in the real price of oil on impact. To allow for
the structural change discussed in Section 4 we present separate estimates for the
period from January 1974 to April 2006 and from May 2006 to May 2013. Figure 9
plots the estimated impulse response functions for a horizon from 0 to 17 months. It
also plots 90% confidence intervals for each horizon that convey the precision of the
estimates.12 The left panel shows that between January 1974 and April 2006, an
unanticipated 1% increase in the real price of oil on average has been associated with
a statistically significant decline in the real price of food. In contrast, after 2006, the
response of the real price of food changes. The real price of food initially drops
sharply and significantly. In months 1 and 2 following the oil price shock, the real
price of food drops to 0.06%. This decline is followed by a recovery that culminates
in a statistically significant peak of the real price of food of 0.04% after 12 months.
At first sight, the initial drop in the real price of food may seem unexpected. The
reason is that in these initial months the real price of gasoline in the consumer basket
increases faster than the real price of food, so food becomes relatively less expensive, if
only because gasoline is even more expensive. We can control for this effect by fitting
the same VAR model with the price of food measured relative to the CPI excluding
food and energy. This alternative definition measures how expensive food is
compared to other consumer prices excluding gasoline in particular. Figure 10 shows
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
-0.1
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
1974:1–2006:4
P
er
ce
nt
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
-0.1
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
2006:5–2013:5
P
er
ce
nt
Figure 9. Response to a 1% real oil price shock – consumer food prices relative
to consumer prices excluding food
Notes: Estimates from monthly bivariate vector autoregressions under the identifying assumption that the real price
of oil is predetermined with 90% bootstrap confidence bands.
12 The confidence intervals for the impulse responses are constructed using a recursive-design wild boot-
strap method as proposed in Goncalves and Kilian (2004). This bootstrap method allows for conditional
heteroscedasticity of unknown form in the data.
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that the decline in the real price of food in response to a 1% unanticipated increase in
the real price of oil prior to May 2006 is statistically insignificant, while the response
after May 2006 now is hump-shaped with a statistically significant peak of 0.05% after
10 months. This evidence supports the notion of a statistically significant relationship
between oil price shocks and food prices after May 2006 and the absence of such a
relationship prior to May 2006. It is useful, however, to keep in mind that the
increases in question are small in magnitude. For example, a household spending
$1,000 on food per month after an unexpected 100% increase in the real price of oil,
all else equal, would have to cut back its expenditures by $50 ten months later. The
small magnitude of these responses is consistent with the evidence in Figure 3 that
food prices have remained rather stable throughout our sample, even as the real price
of oil has fluctuated substantially.
It is useful to decompose these results further. Figure 11 provides analogous results
for the eight major components of US food expenditures. All food prices are measured
relative to the CPI excluding food and energy. There is evidence of statistically signific-
ant increases in the real price of cereals and baked goods, meats/poultry/fish/ eggs, dairy, other
food at home, and food away from home. The response of expenditures on fruits and vegetables
is positive, but not statistically significant. There are no large or statistically significant
responses in non-alcoholic beverages and alcoholic beverages.
5.2. Understanding the pass-through from oil to food prices
It is instructive to examine in more detail how oil price shocks are transmitted to food
prices at different stages of the production of food. One obvious source of higher food
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Figure 10. Response to a 1% real oil price shock – consumer food prices relative
to consumer prices excluding food and energy
Notes: Estimates from monthly bivariate vector autoregressions under the identifying assumption that the real price
of oil is predetermined with 90% bootstrap confidence bands.
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prices are increases in the prices of raw agricultural products driven by higher oil
prices.
There are several channels by which higher oil prices may be transmitted to the
prices of raw agricultural products. For example, it is common to assert that the price
of corn in particular is sensitive to the price of oil because of the use of corn in produ-
cing ethanol. Upon reflection this link is far from obvious. Much depends on why the
real price of oil increases. Gasoline producers blend low-octane gasoline with high-
octane ethanol in approximately fixed proportions.13 If the real price of oil increases
unexpectedly because of a supply disruption in the Middle East, for example, this will
not increase the demand for corn. If anything, it will lower the demand for gasoline
and hence for corn over time, as economic growth slows down and therefore gasoline
demand diminishes.
In contrast, in response to an unexpectedly booming world economy, one would
expect gasoline demand to expand, shifting the derived demand for corn as well as
crude oil. In the latter case, one would expect positive shocks to the real price of oil to
be followed by increases in the real price of corn. This response occurs not because
higher oil prices cause higher corn prices, but because both share a common macro-
economic determinant. This is the central message of studies that have shown that
recent oil price fluctuations in large part are explained by shifts in demand from
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Figure 11. Response of real food prices to a 1% real oil price shock, 2006:5–
2013:5
Notes: Estimates from monthly bivariate vector autoregressions under the identifying assumption that the real price
of oil is predetermined with 90% bootstrap confidence bands.
13 These proportions have evolved somewhat over time in response to changes in fuel standards. Abstract-
ing from the smaller market segment for reformulated gasoline, gasoline producers currently have con-
verged on a profit maximizing strategy of blending 84 octane gasoline produced by refineries with 115
octane ethanol to produce 87 octane regular gasoline at the pump (see Babcock, 2013, p. 3).
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emerging economies (see, e.g., Kilian and Murphy, 2014; Kilian and Hicks, 2013). To
the extent that the global economic expansion underlying the 2003–2008 oil price
increase is associated with a reduction in gasoline consumption in the US, however,
even this link is severed (except to the extent that the US exports ethanol and/or etha-
nol-gasoline blends). More generally the macroeconomic determinants of the real
price of oil would also be expected to raise the real price of wheat and soybeans,
although not to the same extent, as higher real incomes in emerging economies alter
food consumption patterns. A related indirect channel by which higher oil prices may
be associated with higher agricultural prices involves competition for scarce resources
such as water and agricultural land in response to a shift in the demand for corn. Of
course, this effect arises only if the underlying oil price shock is associated with higher
demand for corn.
So far we have considered the case in which high-octane ethanol and low-octane
gasoline are used in approximately fixed proportions. To the extent to which it is
possible to substitute ethanol for low-octane gasoline, as the real price of oil
increases, one would expect higher crude oil prices all else equal to increase the
demand for corn and hence the real price of corn. Such flexibility existed only inter-
mittently after May 2006, however, limiting the scope for large responses in the
demand for corn.
A potentially more important direct channel of transmission, which applies even
in the case of oil-supply-shock driven oil price increases, involves increases in the
cost of producing agricultural products. Of particular importance are increases in
the cost of farm fuel associated with higher oil prices. Although the notion that
higher oil prices are passed through to agricultural crop prices is intuitive, there
are some important caveats. For example, this argument does not apply to the
cost of fertilizer. Whereas the cost of farm fuel closely mimics the price of diesel
fuel and hence depends directly on the price of crude oil, nitrogen fertilizer is pro-
duced from natural gas rather than crude oil.14 Even before 2008, the price of
natural gas did not always follow the price of crude oil. After 2008, even the
long-run statistical relationship between these prices collapsed with the develop-
ment of shale gas in the US. While the real price of crude oil recovered, the real
price of natural gas plummeted, and the cost of fertilizer decoupled from the price
of crude oil.
This means that the direct effect of higher oil prices on the cost of agricultural pro-
duction is effectively bounded by the cost share of fuels in agriculture. Even granting
that this cost share has increased with the surge in fuel prices after 2003, this limits the
potential effects of real oil price shocks. Sands and Westcott (2011) report that direct
energy use (including not only fuels, but also electricity and natural gas) accounts for
14 US agriculture depends on nitrogen-based fertilizers, the production of which requires natural gas as
the primary source of hydrogen for reaction with nitrogen to yield ammonia. The cost of natural gas
accounts for 70–80% of the cost of nitrogen-based fertilizer.
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6.7% of total production expenses in the US farm sector in 2005–2008. A doubling of
diesel fuel prices, on the basis of these estimates, would be associated with perhaps a
5% increase in farm production costs.
These considerations suggest that the scope for the transmission of real oil price
shocks to the real price of agricultural commodities is limited. While there has been a
shift in the real price of corn in recent years associated with a one-time persistent shift
in the demand for corn, how much of that shift was associated with biofuel subsidies,
the prohibition of MTBE, and renewable fuel mandates, and how much of that shift
occurred because ethanol production became viable as a cost-effective alternative to
crude oil as the real price of oil surged, continues to be debated (see Babcock, 2013).
This analysis is further complicated by the fact that, once the initial investment in
expanding ethanol capacity has taken place, continued ethanol production only
requires the price of ethanol to exceed its marginal cost.
Our analysis focuses on the narrower question of how much of the increase in the
real price of corn after May 2006 was systematically related to real oil price shocks. In
the interest of parsimony, our econometric analysis below ignores non-linearities in
the corn and ethanol market that may arise from shifts in capacity constraints (see,
e.g., Abbott, 2013). Our linear regression models provide a first-order approximation
to the average response during this period of real agricultural prices to unexpected
changes in the real price of oil.
5.2.1. How different is corn? A common conjecture is that after May 2006 oil price
shocks raised the price of corn relative to other agricultural commodities that cannot
be used to produce gasoline additives. The reason is that presumably higher demand
for oil during this period was associated with higher demand for corn used in produ-
cing ethanol only after May 2006. This concern may be examined using the model
p
crude=CPI
t
p
corn=wheat
t
 !
VARð6Þ
which relates the price of corn to that of wheat. The left panel of Figure 12, which
focuses on the period of January 1974 through April 2006 shows a statistically insigni-
ficant decline in the price for corn relative to the price of wheat following a 1% unex-
pected increase in the real price of oil. After May 2006, as shown in the right panel,
the response to a 1% unexpected increase in the real price of oil is positive, as conjec-
tured, with a peak response near 0.4%, but the responses are all statistically insigni-
ficant.
Wheat was chosen as the benchmark in Figure 12 because it is relatively less prone
to being used as a biofuel than corn. In contrast, soybeans have played an increasingly
important role in the production of biodiesel after 2006, so the effect of real oil price
shocks on this relative price is ambiguous ex ante. A similar exercise involving the
model
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p
crude=CPI
t
p
corn=soybeans
t
 !
VARð6Þ
indicates that soybean prices have been less responsive to oil price shocks in recent
years than corn prices. Figure 13 shows no statistically significant response of the price
of corn relative to soybeans prior to May 2006, as expected, but a statistically signi-
ficant hump-shaped response with a peak of 0.4% after May 2006.
5.2.2. The response of prices received by US farmers. Figure 14 focuses on the
question of how sensitive the real price of corn, wheat, soybeans and rice received by
US farmers has been to oil price shocks before and after May 2006. The premise of
many policy studies has been that one would expect a larger response after May 2006
for corn and for crops that compete with corn for land and water because of the shift
in US biofuel policies. We estimate pairwise VAR(6) models for the real price of oil
and the real prices of corn, wheat, soybeans, and rice, respectively, for the time
periods before and after May 2006. There is no evidence of a statistically significant
response of the real price of any of these crops prior to May 2006. After May 2006,
the responses of all four real crop prices to a real oil price shock are larger and con-
sistently positive. The real price of corn exhibits the largest, most persistent and most
statistically significant response. The peak response after about one year is 0.7%. The
peak response of the real price of soybeans of 0.5% occurs already after four months
and is marginally statistically significant. The response of the real price of wheat is
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Figure 12. Response to a 1% real oil price shock – corn price received by US
farmers relative to wheat price received by US farmers
Notes: Estimates from monthly bivariate vector autoregressions under the identifying assumption that the real price
of oil is predetermined with 90% bootstrap confidence bands.
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more delayed, reaches a peak of 0.4% after about one year, and is statistically insigni-
ficant. Finally, the real price of rice shows a statistically significant peak response of
0.45% after 8 months. This evidence is consistent with the perception that after May
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Figure 14. Response of grain prices to a 1% real oil price shock: (a) 1974:2–
2006:4; (b) 2006:5–2013:5
Notes: Estimates from monthly bivariate vector autoregressions under the identifying assumption that the real price
of oil is predetermined with 90% bootstrap confidence bands.
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Figure 13. Response to a 1% real oil price shock – corn price received by US
farmers relative to soybean price received by US farmers
Notes: Estimates from monthly bivariate vector autoregressions under the identifying assumption that the real price
of oil is predetermined with 90% bootstrap confidence bands.
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2006 at least the real prices of corn and rice (and to a lesser extent the real price of
soybeans) have been sharing a common determinant with the real price of oil. In
Section 6, we investigate this common component in more detail.
Figure 15 focuses on the evolution of the real price of livestock received by US
farmers in response to a 1% real oil price shock. Estimates of pairwise VAR(6) models
for the real price of oil and the real prices of cattle, hogs, broiler, and turkey, respect-
ively, suggest that prior to May 2006 there is no evidence of a statistically significant
response to real oil price shocks. The missing result for the real price of broiler chicken
reflects gaps in the data. Fitting the same models on data after May 2006, to the
extent that we can compare, all response estimates are larger than before, indicating a
strengthening of the relationship between real oil price shocks and real livestock
prices. The response of the real price of turkey is large and statistically significant with
a peak value of 0.7% after three months. The positive response of the real price of
hogs with a peak value of 0.3% is smaller, but statistically significant; that of the real
price of cattle is in between with a peak value of 0.5%, but is statistically insignificant.
5.2.3. The response of prices paid by US farmers. The responses in Section
5.2.2 may reflect the use of grain crops in the production of biofuels, they may reflect
a shift in the demand for agricultural commodities not related to biofuels, or they may
reflect the increases in the cost of agricultural production associated with higher oil
prices. The link between the price of crude oil and the cost of fuel is self-evident.
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Figure 15. Response of livestock prices to a 1% real oil price shock: (a) 1974:2–
2006:4; (b) 2006:5–2013:5
Notes: Estimates from monthly bivariate vector autoregressions under the identifying assumption that the real price
of oil is predetermined with 90% bootstrap confidence bands.
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To the extent that higher oil prices inflate crop prices, they also directly increase the
cost of animal feed. Finally, higher demand for agricultural products may be associ-
ated with higher fertilizer prices.
Fitting VAR(6) models for the real price of oil and the real prices of fertilizer, farm
fuel and animal feed, respectively, on data since May 2006, allows us to investigate
the responses of the real price of fertilizer, fuel, and animal feed to a 1% real oil price
shock. Figure 16 confirms that all three real cost measures have tended to increase sig-
nificantly in response to oil price shocks after May 2006.
5.3. Revisiting the identification problem
An obvious concern is that unanticipated changes in the real price of oil may simply
reflect higher demand for oil in a booming economy (see Kilian and Murphy, 2014).
Such a situation complicates the interpretation of the responses to such shocks because
higher demand for oil is often followed by higher demand for agricultural and food
commodities, as discussed earlier. Even though our estimates do not control for the
effects of shifts in global demand on crop prices and oil prices, it is clear that doing so
would only diminish the already very small responses of consumer food prices associ-
ated with unexpected variation in the real price of oil. In this sense, it seems safe to
ignore this issue in the context of our empirical analysis. This argument does not apply
to the response of crop prices, however, which indeed may reflect global demand
shocks for commodities as much as or more than other explanations.
To gauge the role of global demand shifts in explaining the responses of
crop prices to real oil price shocks we turn to a different source of identifying
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Figure 16. Response to a 1% real oil price shock, 2006:5–2013:5
Notes: Estimates from monthly bivariate vector autoregressions under the identifying assumption that the real price
of oil is predetermined with 90% bootstrap confidence bands.
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information. As discussed in Section 5.2, we know that the production of nitrogen
fertilizer relies on natural gas rather than crude oil. We also know that the real
price of natural gas at the wellhead has fallen dramatically in recent years. Hence,
the cost-push effect from higher oil prices on the real price of fertilizer must be
negligible. Figure 16, nevertheless, shows a statistically significant positive response
of the real price of fertilizer to a 1% real oil price shock, which can only be
explained by a shift both in the demand for agricultural commodities and for oil.
This fact in turn suggests that the positive responses of the real fuel price and of
the real price of animal feed also reflects in large part the same demand shift, as
do the responses of the agricultural prices in Figures 14 and 15. This observation
is furthermore consistent with the fact that the response of the real price of rice in
Figure 14 is quite similar to that of the real price of corn, even though the produc-
tion of rice should be largely unaffected by shifts in the demand for corn because
rice production is water-intensive and highly concentrated in a few areas of the
US.
In other words, there is no compelling evidence that unexpected changes in the real
price of oil alone and all else equal would have caused a change in agricultural prod-
uct prices after May 2006. This conclusion is consistent with the evidence in Figure 6
based on data prior to May 2006. We defer further investigation of this point to
Section 6. The following subsection focuses on an alternative channel by which real
oil price shocks may affect retail food prices.
5.4.. Quantifying the effect of a higher cost of food marketing on retail food
prices
One of the main reasons why retail food prices are considered sensitive to the price of
oil is that consumer prices for food are thought to depend on the cost of food process-
ing, packaging, advertising, storage, transportation and distribution (collectively
referred to as food marketing). One would expect the spread between retail prices for
food and the prices received by farmers to be responsive to oil price shocks, most
importantly, because the transportation and distribution of fresh food by truck
requires diesel fuel.
Our analysis of this question differs from earlier work including Leibtag (2009),
Berck et al. (2009), and Roeger and Leibtag (2011) in that we quantify these dynamic
effects using semi-structural vector autoregressions estimated on data since May 2006.
One way of capturing the response of this spread to oil price shocks is to match spe-
cific food items in the CPI and in the PPI. We focus on dairy products including
whole milk, butter, cheese, and ice cream, which require refrigeration and hence are
particularly energy intensive in transportation. Our analysis involves fitting for each
food item models of the form
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crude=CPI
t
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CPI dairy food item
t  pPPI dairy food itemt
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VARð6Þ
Because these dairy products are already processed, this exercise primarily tells us
about how sensitive the cost of transportation and distribution is to oil price shocks.
Figure 17 shows that in no case an unanticipated 1% increase in the real price of oil is
associated with an increase in the spread of consumer over producer prices, con-
tradicting the notion that higher energy costs in transportation and distribution are
being passed on from producers to consumers.
Figure 18 focuses on the corresponding spread between the retail price of processed
dairy products paid by consumers and the price of milk received by US farmers.
Unlike Figure 17, this exercise also incorporates the cost of producing these dairy
products from the raw milk sold by the farmer. Figure 18 shows that even in this case
there is no evidence that the cost of processing dairy food is increasing in response to
real oil price shocks. Rather there is evidence of a significant decline in this spread in
the short run. Subsequent increases are small and statistically insignificant.
Even more specific data on the components of food prices is available from the US
Department of Agriculture (USDA), which keeps track of the farm-to-wholesale price
spread and the wholesale-to-retail price spread for pork and for beef sold in the US.
Rather than relying on the spread data provided by the USDA, we recompute the
spreads in question as log deviations of the raw price indices provided by the USDA
to ensure the stationarity of the spread data. Figure 19 shows that, if anything, the
farm-to-wholesale spread declines in response to a real oil price shock, as does the
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Figure 17. Response of CPI/PPI spread to a 1% real oil price shock by dairy
product, 2006:5–2013:5
Notes: Estimates from monthly bivariate vector autoregressions under the identifying assumption that the real price
of oil is predetermined with 90% bootstrap confidence bands.
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wholesale-to-retail spread. There is no evidence that positive shocks to the real price
of oil are associated with increases in the retail price of beef or pork associated with
higher costs of processing, transportation or distribution.
Figure 20 shows results of a complementary exercise focusing on the spread
between the consumer price for a whole fresh chicken and the price US farmers
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Figure 19. Response of pork and beef price spreads to a 1% real oil price shock,
2006:5–2013:5
Notes: Estimates from monthly bivariate vector autoregressions under the identifying assumption that the real price
of oil is predetermined with 90% bootstrap confidence bands.
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Figure 18. Response to a 1% real oil price shock of farm to retail price spread
by dairy product, 2006:5–2013:5
Notes: Estimates from monthly bivariate vector autoregressions under the identifying assumption that the real price
of oil is predetermined with 90% bootstrap confidence bands.
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receive for a broiler chicken, according to the USDA. There is no statistically signi-
ficant increase in this spread in response to a real oil price shock. We also examined
the spread between the price a consumer pays for poultry other than chicken (which
includes turkey) and the price US farmers receive for a live turkey. These responses
again show a statistically significant decline rather than increase.
Figure 21 examines the same question in a different manner. We evaluate the
response to a real oil price shock of consumer prices for flour, for bread, and for
breakfast cereal measured relative to the price of wheat received by US farmers.
Because wheat is one of the main agricultural inputs in producing flour, bread and
breakfast cereal, one would expect higher processing, transportation and distribution
costs driven by higher oil prices to translate into higher spreads. Figure 21 shows no
evidence of such an increase in the spread in response to real oil price shocks, confirm-
ing the earlier results.
We conclude that there is no evidence to support the notion that oil price shocks
are associated with increased food prices driven by higher costs of food processing,
packaging, advertising, transportation and distribution. This result is not unexpected
because we already showed that food prices have been remarkably unresponsive over-
all to oil price shocks even after May 2006. To the extent that there is any response at
all, it appears to be driven by higher crop prices.
A final question that is not so much related to the price of food, but to the price of
serving food is whether a real oil price shock drives up the cost of eating out compared
with eating at home. Figure 22 presents results based on the model
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Figure 20. Response of chicken and turkey price spreads to a 1% real oil price
shock, 2006:5–2013:5
Notes: Estimates from monthly bivariate vector autoregressions under the identifying assumption that the real price
of oil is predetermined with 90% bootstrap confidence bands.
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Figure 22. Response to a 1% real oil price shock of the cost of eating out com-
pared to at home, 2006:5–2013:5
Notes: Estimates from monthly bivariate vector autoregression under the identifying assumption that the real price
of oil is predetermined with 90% bootstrap confidence bands.
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Figure 21. Response to a 1% real oil price shock of wheat-related products,
2006:5–2013:5
Notes: Estimates from monthly bivariate vector autoregressions under the identifying assumption that the real price
of oil is predetermined with 90% bootstrap confidence bands.
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If higher oil prices were associated with higher costs of running restaurants, one
would expect this spread to increase in response to a 1% real oil price shock.
Figure 22 shows that the response instead appears to be significantly negative,
allowing us to rule out this interpretation.
6. A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
Our results are in striking contrast with the literature and public debate on the emer-
gence of global food shortages. It has been common in this debate simply to equate
food prices with the prices of key agricultural commodities such as wheat, corn and
soybeans. For example, Bruno et al. (2013) discuss the evidence for speculation ‘in
food markets’. A casual observer might associate their work with retail food prices,
when this study is actually concerned with the prices of grains and livestock traded
on futures exchanges. Our analysis shows that care must be exercised in drawing a
distinction between the prices of raw agricultural products and the retail price of
food.
Whereas the response of real retail food prices to real oil price shocks has been neg-
ligible even after May 2006, as shown in Figure 10, we documented much larger
responses of the real price of food crops such as corn, wheat, soybeans and rice in Fig-
ure 14. To the extent that consumers in developing countries eat less processed food
than US consumers, the real price of crops is likely to be more representative for food
prices in developing countries than in the US. This observation suggests that we
examine in more detail how sensitive real grain prices in particular are to real oil price
shocks.
In this context, it is important to remind ourselves that the response estimates in
Figure 14 need not represent the causal effects of real oil price shocks. A causal inter-
pretation would require that shocks to the real price of oil are exogenous with respect
to agricultural markets and occur all else equal. This premise seems unlikely, given
the consensus in the literature that recent fluctuations in the real price of oil mainly
arose because of unexpected variation in the global business cycle. Kilian and Hicks
(2013), Kilian and Murphy (2014) and Kilian and Lee (2014), among others, demon-
strate that the real oil price shocks since 2003 have reflected primarily global shocks to
the flow demand for oil associated with unexpected industrial growth in emerging
Asia. The same growth is likely to be followed by higher incomes in emerging Asia
and hence by higher demand for high-quality food. Thus, an alternative interpreta-
tion is that increases in the real price of oil and increases in real crop prices in recent
years have shared a common component that is associated with fluctuations in the
global real activity and incomes.
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6.1. Are crop price increases associated with shifts in global real activity?
We examine this question by relating changes in the real price of crops to flow
demand shocks for crude oil and other industrial raw materials. An unanticipated
expansion in global industrial activity, for example, is associated with increased
demand for industrial raw materials to be used in the production of industrial
goods. Estimates of such flow demand shocks may be recovered from structural oil
market models such as the models used in Kilian and Murphy (2014) or Kilian and
Lee (2014).15 Below we relate the per cent change in the real price of corn, wheat,
soybeans and rice to the historical evolution of these flow demand shocks. Our
objective is to separate the component of price changes that is associated with unex-
pected variation in the global business cycle from the component that is driven by
other shocks. Given that the global business cycle as measured in these studies
relates to industrial activity, there is no reason to expect the effect of flow demand
shocks on the real price of crops to be as large as their effect on the real price of oil
or on other industrial commodity prices. Moreover, one would expect changes in
real income and in food consumption in emerging economies to follow fluctuations
in industrial activity only with a delay.
We quantify this effect by fitting a distributed lag model with intercept a to the per
cent change in the real price of corn:
Dpcorn=CPIt ¼ aþ b0ut þ b1ut1 þ . . .þ b12ut12 þ et
where the mean zero regression error εt may be heteroscedastic and serially corre-
lated, and where the regressor ut denotes the flow demand shock recovered from an
updated estimate of the structural oil market model used in Kilian and Lee (2014). In
estimating the distributed lag model, we restrict the sample to the period since May
2006 to allow for a structural change in May 2006 in the relationship between flow
demand shocks and real crop prices. The response of the real price of corn to a flow
demand shock may be constructed by cumulating the regression coefficients
@Dpcorn=CPItþh =@ut ¼ bh, h = 0, 1, 2, . . ., 12. Similar regressions are fit for the real prices
of wheat, soybeans and rice.
Figure 23 shows that all four real crop prices respond positively to a global flow
demand shock, but only the responses of the real prices of corn, soybeans and rice are
statistically significant based on pointwise one-standard error bands obtained using
15 These studies rely on a fully structural VAR model of the per cent change in global crude oil produc-
tion, an index of fluctuations in the global business cycle developed in Kilian (2009), the real price of crude
oil, and the change in above-ground crude oil inventories. The model differentiates between flow supply
shocks, flow demand shocks, speculative demand shocks and a residual shock that captures idiosyncratic
demand shocks. These structural shocks are jointly identified based on a combination of sign restrictions
on the structural impulse responses and bounds on the impact price elasticities of oil demand and oil
supply.
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the block bootstrap. Given the short sample, this low level of statistical significance is
expected.
6.2. How much of the change in crop prices is accounted for by the global
business cycle?
Having established a tentative link between the global business cycle and real grain
prices, it is natural to ask how much of the evolution of real crop prices on the basis of
these estimates may be attributed to flow demand shocks. It can be shown that the
explanatory power of flow demand shocks for real crop prices is far from dominant,
but not negligible. The fitted values of the distributed lag regressions imply that 17%
of the variation in the growth rate of the real price of wheat is explained by flow
demand shocks, 19% of the variation in the growth rate of the real price of soybeans,
27% of the variation in the growth rate of the real price of corn and 24% of the vari-
ation in the growth rate of the real price of rice. These effects are larger than conjec-
tured in Wright (2014), for example, but not overwhelmingly large.
Figure 24 plots the component of these growth rates that is not explained by global
flow demand shocks. Much has been made of the possibility of speculation driving
agricultural crop markets. If the residual variation in Figure 24 reflected speculation
in agricultural crop markets, we would expect real price changes to be highly correl-
ated across different crops. Table 2 shows that the residual growth rates of the real
prices of corn and wheat have a correlation of only 0.50. The correlation of 0.61
between corn and soybeans is only slightly higher, whereas the correlation between
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Figure 23. Responses of grain prices to global flow demand shocks, 2006:5–
2013:5
Notes: Estimates from distributed lag models relating the growth rate in each real grain price to exogenous flow
demand shocks obtained from an update of the model of Kilian and Lee (2014) with 1-standard error bootstrap
confidence bands.
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wheat and soybeans is much lower with an estimate of 0.40.16 These estimates cast
doubt on explanations of the residual variation in the data based on speculation in
agricultural crops. This impression is reinforced by inspection of Figure 24. For exam-
ple, the increases in the real price of wheat in 2007 are not mirrored by similar
increases in the real price of corn or soybeans, suggesting an idiosyncratic supply or
demand shock in the wheat market in 2007 and 2008 (including domestic supply
shocks as well as fluctuations in foreign demand for US crops and in foreign supplies
of crops competing with US crops).
Table 2. Correlation of Residual Growth Rates in Real Grain Prices after Con-
trolling for Cumulative Effect of Flow Demand Shocks, 2006.5–2013.5
Real price
of corn
Real price
of wheat
Real price
of soybeans
Real price
of rice
Real price of corn 1 0.50 0.61 0.06
Real price of wheat  1 0.40 –0.04
Real price of soybeans   1 0.08
Real price of rice    1
Notes: Authors’ computations based on residuals from distributed lag models relating the growth rate in each real
grain price to exogenous flow demand shocks obtained from an update of the model of Kilian and Lee (2014).
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Figure 24. Growth rate in grain prices unexplained by flow demand shocks,
2006:5–2013:5
Notes: Residuals from distributed lag models relating the growth rate in each real grain price to exogenous flow
demand shocks obtained from an update of the model of Kilian and Lee (2014).
16 This pattern is consistent with the fact that in many US states soybeans and corn are substitutes in pro-
duction.
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There are many other potential reasons for the residual comovement in Table 2.
Apart from droughts or floods that may affect more than one crop at the same time,
another possible explanation of a positive residual correlation would be competition
for land and water in response to US biofuel policies, amplified by the use of both
corn and soybeans as biofuels. For example, Wright (2014), when explaining how
increased demand for biofuels raised grain crop prices after 2005 notwithstanding
increased production, emphasizes the substitution of biofuels for petroleum based fuels
together with the substitution in food consumption and animal feed between wheat
and corn (as well as wheat and rice in some regions of the world) and the stockpiling
of grains in anticipation of rising demand for biofuels.
The latter interpretation is consistent with the higher correlation in Table 2 of corn
with soybeans, which is also used in the production of US biofuel, compared with
wheat, which by and large is not. It is also consistent with a substantial increase in the
residual correlations between corn and wheat and between wheat and soybeans com-
pared with the pre-May 2006 data. It is inconsistent, however, with a largely
unchanged residual correlation between corn and soybeans, compared with the pre-
May 2006 data. The most striking feature of Table 2 is the low residual correlations
of rice with respect to the other food commodities. In fact, these correlations are even
lower than prior to May 2006, suggesting that the causes of increases in the real price
of rice are unrelated to those underlying the real price of corn, soybeans and wheat.
We conclude that, after controlling for the global business cycle, none of the stand-
ard explanations of higher crop prices including the shift in US biofuel policies by
itself seems to provide a good fit for the agricultural crop price data. In particular, it is
difficult to attribute increases in the real price of corn, wheat and soybeans simply to
biofuel mandates, given the heterogeneity in results across crop prices. This conclu-
sion is especially evident for the real price of rice, which is perhaps the single most
important food commodity for many developing countries. On the basis of our evi-
dence, it appears that increases in the real price of rice were largely unrelated to US
biofuel policies and to oil-market specific events. Figure 25 illustrates the latter point
without the help of a formal model. It shows that the real price of rice continued to
increase even as the real price of oil collapsed in the second half of 2008, and declined
in 2009 and 2010, while the real price of oil recovered. Moreover, the persistent
decline in the real price of rice after 2009 underscores that the shift in US biofuel pol-
icies had no relevance for the evolution of this price, which appears to be due to a
combination of idiosyncratic factors and a shift in global real incomes. This finding is
not surprising perhaps, as there is no competition between rice and corn in produc-
tion, limiting substitution effects to the consumption side of the market.
6.3. Implications of higher crop prices for industrialized countries
Our evidence shows that retail food price increases in the United States were modest.
There were no large spikes or surges in US retail food prices. This means that there is
730 CHRISTIANE BAUMEISTER AND LUTZ KILIAN
no reason to expect a significant negative impact of higher crop prices on consumers
in the United States. In other words, there is no reason to be concerned about the wel-
fare implications of higher crop prices in the United States. One would expect similar
results for other industrialized economies (and increasingly for emerging economies),
in which food consumption consists mainly of processed foods.
We already showed that a low share of agricultural commodities in the cost of pro-
ducing processed foods means that even large price swings in agricultural commodity
markets have little effect on retail consumer prices for food. We provided evidence that
this share is low for the United States, taking advantage of the availability of detailed
data on US consumer prices and prices paid and received by farmers. Such detailed
data are not readily available for other industrialized countries, but one can show that
consumer food price inflation is not a major problem in other industrialized countries
either by comparing the food price inflation rates in leading industrialized countries.
Table 3 shows the cumulative and average rates of food price inflation in the
United States, Canada, the eurozone, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom,
and Japan since May 2006. Because data on the CPI excluding all food items are not
readily available for many of these economies, we deflate the CPI for food by the
overall CPI. For countries such as the United States it can be shown that this normali-
zation makes little difference, given the relatively small share of food in overall
consumer expenditures (see Table 1). Table 3 confirms that consumer food price
inflation adjusted for overall inflation has been low not just in the United States. In
fact, in the eurozone and in Japan food price inflation has been even lower, and in
Canada only slightly higher. By far the highest real food price increases are observed
in the United Kingdom, but even there the average rate of increase has been only 2%
per year. These increases are so modest that there is no apparent reason to be
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Figure 25. Real prices of rice and crude oil, 2006:5–2013:5
Notes: Authors’ computations based on the data described in the appendix.
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concerned with the welfare implications of higher crop prices for these industrialized
countries.
6.4. Implications of higher crop prices for developing countries
The evidence in Table 3, of course, does not mean that higher crop prices are not a
problem for many developing countries. One reason is that consumers in poor coun-
tries do not eat as much highly processed food. One would expect the prices of staple
foods such as wheat, corn, and rice in poor countries to track the prices of agricultural
commodities much more closely than they track the corresponding retail food prices
in industrialized countries. To illustrate this point consider a country in which the diet
consists mainly of rice. Figure 26 plots the price of processed rice, as measured by the
US consumer price index, and the price of rice received by US farmers. The plot
shows that over the period from 2006:5 until 2008:5, for example, the price of unpro-
cessed rice received by US farmers increased by an additional 50% compared with
the price of processed rice faced by consumers in the United States. The real price of
rice in global food commodity markets increased by an additional 100% compared
with the US consumer price of processed rice. This evidence suggests that the popula-
tion of countries consuming less processed rice is likely to have been disproportion-
ately affected by rising rice prices in global markets.
Despite the importance of this question, there is little systematic evidence on how
the real price of staple foods has evolved in poor countries worldwide. Documenting
changes in the real price of staple foods in poor countries over time is a difficult task
because it requires detailed and reliable data on consumer prices, which do not in
general exist in developing countries, it requires information about local diets, and it
requires data on nominal exchange rates. Without such time series data one is forced
to rely on survey data, which is indeed what many academic studies have done (e.g.,
Table 3. Percent Change in Consumer Food Prices Relative to the Overall CPI,
2006.5–2013.5
Cumulative Growth Average Annual Growth
United States 6 0.8
Canada 9 1.2
Euro area 3 0.4
France 2 0.2
Germany 7 1.0
Italy 3 0.4
United Kingdom 15 2.0
Japan 2 0.3
Notes: The data sources are described in the appendix. Food price inflation is computed by adjusting inflation in
the food CPI by inflation in the overall CPI, given the lack of data for the CPI excluding food for many industri-
alized economies. It can be shown that this normalization makes little difference for countries such as the United
States where the CPI excluding food exists because the share of food in the overall CPI tends to be small for
industrialized countries (see Table 1).
732 CHRISTIANE BAUMEISTER AND LUTZ KILIAN
Ivanic et al., 2012). Other studies work directly with time series of global agricultural
commodity prices (e.g., Giordani et al., 2012).
As the review of the literature in the introduction illustrates, there is rightly great
concern about the welfare implications of large increases in the real price of staple
foods in developing countries. The concern is not only that poor countries are more
exposed to increases in food commodity prices for the reasons discussed above, but
that a price increase of the same magnitude has a greater impact on the welfare of the
average household, because households in poor countries spend a higher fraction of
their income on food than consumers in industrialized countries and because they are
more likely to live close to subsistence levels. For example, the food share in US con-
sumer expenditures is about 13%, while estimates put the expenditure share of food
for poor people in developing countries somewhere between 40% and 70% (see de
Hoyos and Medvedev, 2011).
While these points are well taken, there also are reasons to be cautious about
accepting the usual presumption in the policy debate that higher global crop prices,
inflicted on developing economies by market forces or by the actions of industrialized
economies, are responsible for political strife, malnutrition and food riots in poor
countries. One reason is that the US dollar has been fluctuating with respect to many
foreign currencies, so the real price of food in the consumption units of developing
countries may be much lower or much higher than the real price in US consumption
units. For example, the Central African Currency Unit appreciated against the US
dollar by nearly 20% from mid-2006 to mid-2008, during the surge in global wheat
and rice prices, presumably offsetting some of that real price increase measured in
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Figure 26. Alternative measures of the real price of rice, 2006:5–2013:5
Notes: Authors’ computations based on the data described in the appendix. The IMF commodity price refers to
the Thai wholesale price index (US$/metric ton); the US crop price refers to the price received by US farmers;
the US consumer price to the price of processed rice. All price series have been deflated by the US CPI and
normalized to 0 in May 2006.
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domestic consumption units. At the same time, food riots in poor countries that are
usually attributed to higher crop import prices may also be associated with rapidly
depreciating local currencies unrelated to agricultural markets. For example, between
May 2006 and 2013, the US dollar appreciated by 40% relative to the currency of
Uganda and by 50% relative to the currency of Botswana, amplifying the impact of
higher international crop prices. This means that we have to be careful to distinguish
between global crop prices and domestic food prices in developing countries.
Another reason for scepticism is that higher crop prices may be bad news for urban
consumers in developing countries, but tend to be good news for farmers in rural
areas. It is by no means self-evident from a welfare point of view whether developing
countries overall are worse off or better off as a result of higher crop prices. Ivanic and
Martin (2008) emphasize that the overall impact on poverty in developing countries
depends on whether the gains to poor net food producers in rural areas outweigh the
losses incurred by poor urban consumers. Answering this question requires detailed
household survey data. Whether higher food commodity prices improve or worsen
the welfare of a particular household depends on the products involved, how integ-
rated the poor are into the cash economy, their pattern of incomes and expenditures,
other economic changes potentially associated with higher commodity food prices
(such as higher real wages for unskilled labour in the context of a booming economy),
and, most importantly, the domestic and trade policies pursued by the governments in
poor countries. In related work, Ivanic et al. (2012) conclude that the 2010–11
increase in food commodity prices was associated with approximately a 1% increase
in poverty in low income countries on average with enormous variation across coun-
tries. The statistical significance of this estimate is not assessed, however.
It is indeed ironic that for decades declining real prices of crops have been held
responsible for the economic plight of many developing countries, but now a reversal
of this trend is considered equally detrimental to their welfare. Undoubtedly, an
important determinant of the effects of higher food commodity prices on the poor in
low income countries is government policies. Ivanic and Martin’s (2008) empirical
analysis confirms that an increase in the real price of rice, for example, raises welfare
in countries such as Vietnam, given the relatively egalitarian land distribution in that
country, while lowering welfare in countries such as Pakistan with a higher fraction of
poor urban consumers. This evidence suggests that we need to be careful not to attri-
bute the effects of long-standing government policies to higher food commodity prices.
Given that in some developing countries mismanagement and government restrictions
have stunted the agricultural sector to the point of food imports being the only option
available to the government to pacify the urban poor, it seems especially misleading to
hold higher global crop prices responsible for the effects of these countries’ earlier
government interventions.
A third point to consider is that it does not seem warranted to view higher price vol-
atility in food commodity markets as necessarily exogenous with respect to poor coun-
tries. Martin and Anderson (2012), for example, stress that trade barriers intended to
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shield poor countries from fluctuations in food commodity prices may in fact have
magnified the international price instability associated with exogenous shocks. They
estimate that 45% of the increase in the global price of rice and 30% of the increase
in the global price of wheat during 2005–2008 can be explained by changes in border
protection rates (also see Ivanic and Martin, 2014). In related work, Giordani et al.
(2012) estimate that a 1% increase in the share of exports covered by export restric-
tions is associated with an increase in global agricultural commodity prices by 1.1%.
It is important to stress that trade policies in this context are not the impulse triggering
food price increases; rather they help propagate and amplify rising food prices. Hence,
we must be careful not to attribute to other shocks the welfare consequences of restric-
tive trade policies. Anderson et al. (2013), for example, conclude that the net effect of
policies intended to insulate poor consumers from food commodity price shocks on
global markets may actually have been to increase global poverty in 2008.
Finally, it is easy to forget that it is in part the economic success of emerging eco-
nomies that has contributed to a substantial increase in oil prices as well as agricul-
tural crop prices in the first place. Surely, one would not want to deny developing
countries pursuing sensible economic policies the right to industrialize because other
developing countries pursuing harmful economic policies have a hard time coping
with higher food import prices as a result. A more sensible policy approach would be
to insist that all developing countries with food shortages including countries in Africa
and in the Middle East implement economic policies that facilitate the development
of their agricultural sector if they find themselves unable to pay for food imports.
None of these caveats diminish the economic plight of the urban and rural poor in
many developing countries and the fact that higher food commodity prices may wor-
sen their economic situation, but they suggest that a more nuanced view than the testi-
mony of Rosegrant (2008), for example, is important in developing policy solutions to
these problems. It may seem that the precise cause of higher agricultural crop prices
would be secondary, when these price increases are viewed from the perspective of a
developing country without a significant industrial sector. This is not the case because
the causes of higher food prices matter for the design of appropriate policy responses.
We stressed, for example, that a good case can be made that inappropriate agricul-
tural and trade policies in many developing countries helped amplify the observed
food shortages. Moreover, our evidence suggests that calls for an end to biofuel
programmes may not have the desired effect of lowering global food prices.
7. CONCLUSION
There is substantial evidence that US biofuel policies have been associated with size-
able increases in the real price of corn since 2006, as the production of ethanol began
to compete for the production of food. In this paper, we examined the complementary
question of the transmission of oil price shocks to food prices both prior to and after
this change in US policy. One concern is to what extent higher oil prices cause higher
OIL AND FOOD PRICES 735
food prices. A related concern is how this transmission takes place in practice. These
questions have taken on a new importance, as policymakers are growing increasingly
concerned about the prospect of a global food shortage.
A common perception among academics and policymakers is that oil price
increases in recent years have been associated with higher food prices. We showed
that there is no evidence that US retail food prices closely tracked oil prices before or
after the change in US biofuel policies in May 2006. Notwithstanding substantial vari-
ation in the real price of crude oil, indices of the real retail price of food faced by US
consumers remained remarkably stable over time even after the shift in US biofuel
policies. This is not true, in contrast, for the real prices of major agricultural commod-
ities produced in the United States such as corn, wheat, soybeans and rice. Corn and
soybeans experienced average real price increases of between 12% and 15% per year
after May 2006, while the real prices of wheat and rice grew at an annual rate of 7%.
The distinction between retail food prices and the prices received by farmers for
grain crops and livestock is important. Policy concerns about a looming food shortage
appear to be based on rising real crop prices received by farmers as opposed to rising
real food prices faced by US consumers. Although US consumer food prices have
increased substantially in nominal terms, the cost of food measured in terms of other
consumer goods has increased only by 7% cumulatively since May 2006 (or 1% per
year). The discrepancy between the slow growth in real consumer food prices and the
more rapid growth in the crop prices received by farmers is explained by the small
cost share of agricultural products in the food prices paid by US consumers. For
example, the farm value of wheat in the price of bread is only about 5%, so even sub-
stantial wheat price increases are associated with only small increases in the price of
bread.
We provided evidence that after May 2006 unexpected increases in the real price
of oil have indeed been followed by systematic increases in some US crop prices. For
example, a 1% real oil price shock tends to be followed by a persistent and statistically
significant increase in the real price of corn that peaks at 0.5% one year later. The
same real oil price shock is followed by much smaller increases in US consumer prices
for food (measured relative to the CPI excluding food and energy) with a peak
response of only 0.05%. We emphasized that these responses should not be inter-
preted as the causal effects of higher oil prices, however, because the real oil price
shocks that took place after May 2006 mainly reflected broad-based shifts in the
demand for industrial commodities.
There are two main channels for oil price shocks to affect food prices. One channel
is through an increase in crop prices; the other is through an increase in the cost of
processing agricultural crops and of delivering the processed foods to the retail con-
sumer. An increase in crop prices may arise because oil price shocks raise the cost of
producing crops or because oil price shocks are associated with higher demand for
crops. We showed that the latter explanation fits the data better because the real price
of fertilizer (the production of which does not depend on the price of crude oil but on
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the price of natural gas) responds significantly to real oil price shocks after May 2006
much like other agricultural prices. Given the divergence of the prices of oil and nat-
ural gas in recent years, this evidence can only be explained by a shift in the demand
for agricultural products. In fact, 27% of the variation in the growth rate of the real
price of corn since May 2006 can be explained by changes in demand associated with
shifts in global real economic activity. The remaining price variation is by no means
due to corn-ethanol mandates alone. Our analysis suggests that the evolution of the
real prices of corn, wheat, soybeans and rice, while sharing a common component, is
determined by a variety of factors that can differ from one crop to the next.
With regard to the effect of oil price shocks on the cost of food marketing, we found
that, contrary to prevailing wisdom, there is no evidence that unexpected increases in
the real price of oil are associated with higher food prices because of the increased cost
of processing, transporting and distributing food. To the extent that there is any pass-
through from oil to food prices, it reflects higher crop prices only.
Our results are in striking contrast with a growing literature and public debate on
the emergence of global food shortages. It has been common in this debate to attri-
bute hunger and malnutrition among the poor in developing countries to increased
food price volatility in recent years. Our analysis showed that there has been no sys-
tematic increase in food price volatility. Only for wheat is there any evidence of a
noticeable increase in price volatility and the reasons appear idiosyncratic rather than
systematic. We emphasized that the real problem for consumers, if there is one, is one
of rising food prices, not of volatile prices. The effect of increases in crop prices on
consumers may differ greatly across countries.
We stressed, for example, that because of the absence of pass-through from crop
prices to US retail food prices, a significant negative impact on consumers in the
United States can be ruled out. One would expect similar results for other industrial-
ized economies (and increasingly for emerging economies), in which food consump-
tion consists mainly of processed foods. This conjecture is consistent with evidence of
low food price inflation in many industrialized economies.
A different matter is to what extent increases in the real price of food commodities
affect the welfare of poor households in the least industrialized countries which tend to
consume less processed food and spend a larger share of their income on food. The
answer is not obvious, because poor farmers in developing countries are likely to be
producers as well as consumers of food commodities. Providing a reliable answer to this
question requires detailed household survey data for extended periods. Recent studies
show enormous variation in the effects of higher food commodity prices on poverty in
developing economies. Our interpretation of this evidence is that, whether a country
benefits from rising food commodity prices or not, in important part appears related to
the agricultural, exchange rate, and trade policies it pursues and that these policies tend
to predate recent food commodity price increases. We made the case that a more
nuanced analysis is called for than is embodied in some recent policy statements.
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Discussion
Wolf Wagner
Tilburg University
There has been quite some talk about the potential adverse effects of higher oil prices
for the prices of food. The background is a 2006 policy change in the US, which pro-
moted the use of crop for the production of ethanol. Coincident with that policy
change, the prices of many cultural commodity products have been on the rise. And
as often happens, some commenters and policymakers were quick to draw conclusions
from this observation.
The paper by Baumeister and Kilian subjects the matter to a serious analysis and
debunks the myth that higher oil prices are responsible for the increase in food prices.
The key insight is that one needs to distinguish between commodity prices and retail food
prices. While there is some evidence that commodity prices have increased post-2006,
there is no convincing evidence that this has also fed through to higher retail prices,
which are the prices that should matter from a policy perspective. After all, this is to
be expected since commodities only constitute a small share of overall food prices (the
share of wheat in the price of bread, for instance, is only 5%). In hindsight, the results
are thus not surprising, but this argument was clearly missing in the public debate. So
the paper makes an important point.
Key for examining the potential link between oil prices and food prices is of course
proper identification. The relationship between the two variables is rife with reverse
causality and simultaneity problems. For instance, oil and food prices may simply
jointly react to the business cycle and there may hence not be any causality at all. The
main empirical exercise in the paper is a VAR that includes two variables, the relative
price of oil and the relative price of food. This allows disentangling causality between
the two variables. In addition, the paper provides a discussion of endogeneity with
respect to global demand shifts, exploiting the price of nitrogen fertilizer (production
of this fertilizer relies on natural gas rather than crude oil). This discussion clearly alle-
viates endogeneity concerns. However, it would have been preferable to tackle endo-
geneity head-on in the econometric exercise – so in my view concerns about
identification remain.
One way to bolster causal interpretation would be to exploit heterogeneity. The
paper finds noticeable differences in the response of food prices to oil prices for differ-
ent types of foods. Can this be reconciled with a different importance of oil prices for
various food products? Products that are more dependent on oil should display more
pronounced responses to oil prices. Evidence of heterogeneity linked to oil depend-
ence would corroborate the idea of a causal effect.
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A curious detail in the empirical specification is the definition of relative prices: food
prices are measured relative to consumer prices excluding food, while oil prices are
measured relative to consumer prices. Two questions arise in this respect. First, it is
not clear that we are interested in relative prices at all. Suppose oil prices do raise food
prices, but the prices of non-food items as well, and do so in a proportional fashion. In
this case, no impact on food prices will be identified by the specification. Is this what
we want? I am not sure. It is not clear that policymakers would only worry in case
food prices go up relative to other prices. If oil prices raise consumer costs across the
board, this is arguably also a concern. The second issue is that because different
denominators are used for relative prices (one time CPI, and the other time CPI
excluding food), relative prices can change even if neither crude nor food prices
change (to see this, consider an increase in non-food CPI). While there may be tech-
nical reasons for choosing this specification, it opens up the possibility of the relation-
ship capturing unintended effects.
Deren Unalmis
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey
The paper is on a timely and important subject, and has striking findings. Baumeister
and Kilian aim to quantify the impact of changes in oil prices on food prices. They
question whether the links from the price of oil to the prices of agricultural commod-
ities and their retail prices have strengthened recently, after a policy shift in the US in
2006. The study sheds light on the causes of the recent increases in the prices of vari-
ous food items and their impacts on the consumer welfare in developed and develop-
ing countries, hence providing important policy implications.
Although the authors find some impact of the price of oil on agricultural commod-
ity prices, the effects on retail prices are found to be relatively limited. Besides, they
show that the observed comovement between oil and food prices is partially driven by
global business cycles. They conclude that the negative effects of the environmental
policy shift on welfare in industrialized and developing countries are so far limited.
The underlying problem is simple. The real prices of food commodities had been
on a declining trend since mid-1970s, but this trend was reversed around mid-2000s.
Since food prices are highly related to consumer welfare (food has a large share in the
consumption basket in many countries), it is quite important for the policymakers to
understand the reason for the recent increases in food prices and to know whether this
shift is transitory or permanent.
In fact, some food items seem to be more seriously affected. For example, when we
compare the developments in an aggregate real food price index to the developments
in the real price of corn (which is extensively used in the US for ethanol production),
we observe that the recent increases in the real price of corn and its volatility are more
evident compared to the aggregate food index. As stated in this paper, one possible
(plausible) explanation of the increases in food prices is the major shift in the US
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policies in favour of using more biofuel, which became effective after May 2006. This
type of policy change is expected to increase the dependency on agricultural commod-
ities, due to an additional demand created by the biofuel production.
Food and energy prices had already been linked through the stages of production,
food processing, food packaging and distribution. The policy change mentioned
above has created a new link between the price of oil and the prices of agricultural
commodities. This new link is expected to strengthen over time as the substitutability
between oil and biofuel increases. Higher substitutability can be caused by two devel-
opments. The first one is advancement of the biofuel production technology, leading
to an increase and standardization in the biofuel quality. The second one is the devel-
opment of machines and vehicles which are more compatible with the use of biofuel.
Higher substitutability between oil and biofuel implies a stronger comovement
between the prices of oil and food commodities. The paper also stresses the fact that
agricultural commodities are linked by many channels. Hence, if oil, corn and other
agricultural commodities that are used in fuel production become substitutes, this
should also increase the comovement in the prices of other agricultural commodities,
even if they are not used in fuel production.
In fact, many recent studies in the literature find that the causality from the price of
oil to the prices of food commodities has increased after the policy change. This is bad
news, because oil prices are historically much more volatile than the food prices and
since global oil reserves are running out, oil prices are expected to increase further in
the medium to long run. The danger is that all the unrest in the oil market might now
be felt in the food market amplifying the effects of the oil market specific shocks. How-
ever, Baumeister and Kilian warn that the studies in the literature tend to use atheo-
retical methods, like Granger non-causality tests, reduced form VAR impulse
responses, and reduced form VAR or VECM coefficients as measures of causal
impacts.
Authors also indicate that the link between the prices of oil and food is driven large-
ly by macroeconomic developments. Besides, they say that it is necessary to take into
account not only the causality running from oil prices to food prices, but also the
causality running in the other direction. Hence, different from the related literature,
Baumeister and Kilian instead use a structural econometric framework to examine
the issue.
Before moving onto my comments, I would like to state that this discussion needs to
be regarded as suggestions for future work rather than a criticism of the current paper.
Given the short sample size and data availability I believe that the authors do a great
job providing answers to a recently important issue.
I have three major comments. First, I argue that such policy changes do not neces-
sarily create a strong comovement since there are two clashing effects. Given a posit-
ive level of substitution between oil and food as alternative sources of energy, all else
equal, the two prices are expected to be positively related. However, news about a
740 CHRISTIANE BAUMEISTER AND LUTZ KILIAN
change in the substitutability between these two types of commodities could create an
effect in the opposite direction.
Imagine news is spread in the markets about a policy shift that encourage or require
the use of more biofuels. The market participants will interpret this as the economy
being less dependent on oil and more dependent on agricultural products in the
future. This is relieving for the oil market and hence the response of the price of oil
has to be downwards. On the other hand, the same development will have the oppos-
ite effect on the prices of agricultural commodities that are used in biofuel production,
that is, the prices of agricultural commodities will rise. In fact, looking closer to the
data around and since mid-2006, it is possible to see that, after around the policy shift
towards the use of more ethanol, the prices of corn and oil moved in opposite direc-
tions for some time (see Figure 27). Figure 27 also shows that, when prices are
indexed to 1 in May 2006, the corn price seems to be persistently higher than the
price of oil since 2006. If this effect was one-off (only in May 2006 for example) it
would not constitute much of a problem. Because the only thing to do in this case
would be to separate the sample into two (as pre-policy change period and post-policy
change period) and carry out the analysis in two separate subsamples as this study did.
However, many other countries follow with similar policy changes with subsidies and
quantitative targets for biofuel (for example, Europe in 2009).
This behaviour in oil and food prices in opposite direction is likely to be observed
every time there is a policy shift encouraging the use of more biofuel. Since many
countries are in the process of developing their own biodiesel programmes (see Avalos,
2014 for a list of countries), the markets are faced with such news from time to time.
Moreover, not only policy shifts but also news about increases in the efficiency of
Figure 27. Real price of corn and oil since 2005 (May 2006=1)
Source: Bloomberg, author’s calculations.
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biofuel production or consumption can decrease the dependency on oil. In addition,
the fact that the biofuel market is currently too small compared to the oil market can
be another reason why it is early to see a strong positive relationship between oil and
food prices due to the substitution effect.
My second comment is on the structural VAR (SVAR) model used in the paper.
The authors criticize the existing literature for using atheoretical methods. Although
going a step further, in my view, the authors cannot fully address two problems in
their SVAR estimation. First, they cannot directly include variables to capture the
macroeconomic developments, due to the fact that the sample sizes are too short for
any model larger than a bivariate model. But they do show afterwards that the com-
modity prices worldwide are dependent on variations in global flow demand shocks.
Second, Baumeister and Kilian use a recursive identification approach where it is
assumed that there is no contemporaneous effect running from food to oil prices. In
other words, the authors assume that food market specific shocks do not have an
impact on the price of oil within a month. This assumption seems reasonable for the
SVAR estimation in Baumeister and Kilian since they are looking at agricultural com-
modity prices received by US farmers. However, for global food commodity prices, I
think this assumption may be less valid recently and it can be even less valid in the
future. The oil market may be becoming more sensitive to the food market specific
shocks (for example, unexpected extreme weather conditions in cultivated regions) as
the share of biofuel in the total energy usage increases.
Figure 28 presents the behaviour of the prices of corn and oil during a recent food
market specific event. The US Department of Agriculture released its ‘World Agricul-
tural Supply and Demand Estimates’ report of the year on 9 May 2014 at 12 noon,
which had predicted record corn and soybean harvests for 2014/2015 (see USDA,
2014). This announcement was regarded as a surprise in the financial markets, since
expectations regarding the agricultural supply performance were much weaker.
Hence, when this report was out, the markets immediately responded with a sharp
drop in the price of corn (a decline of 3% in half an hour). Although this shock is not
specific to the oil market, the price of oil as well responded with a significant decline
(of 0.7% within half an hour). Hence, high frequency data in this case indeed suggests
that oil prices respond immediately to food market specific shocks. Obviously, this
point deserves investigation in the future using a formal statistical analysis with
satisfactorily large set of recent events.17
Thirdly, as future work, I would like to stress that a suitable theoretical model could
complement the empirical work in this study. Although theoretical models often are
incapable of measuring the quantitative importance of relevant channels, they can
help us provide some policy recommendations for the future.
17 Admittedly, observing high frequency comovement does not necessarily establish comovement at the
monthly frequency, which is relevant for the analysis in Baumeister and Kilian.
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Although the paper is great in the sense that it attempts to answer important recent
questions, it cannot go into the issue of future policy recommendations. One concern
is that if the industrialized countries continue pursuing these types of policies, the sub-
stitutability between oil and agricultural commodities will increase, driving the food
prices up even further. After some time, the cost share of agricultural commodities in
retail prices might come up to levels that the retailers will be less reluctant to reflect
the increases in the prices of agricultural commodities.
A general equilibrium model would be useful, which allows for substitutability
between oil and biofuel. In the context of such a model, it would be possible to carry
out a sensitivity analysis for higher degrees of substitution. In the model, the existence
of storage/inventory behaviour for both oil and agricultural commodities would be
key to understand the role of speculative motives in driving prices in commodity mar-
kets. Unalmis et al. (2012) model competitive oil storage in the US, in the context of a
general equilibrium model, and show that ignoring the speculative motive amplifies or
mitigates the effects of oil price shocks depending on the source of the shock. More-
over, an analysis of different monetary policy environments, including the case of zero
lower bound would help us understand what would happen (in a relative sense) in a
conventional monetary policy environment. In order to derive useful policy implica-
tions for the global economy, a detailed welfare analysis in a model with at least two
country blocks (developed and developing countries) would be extremely useful. For
example, it would be interesting to look at the implications of trade barriers, food sub-
sidies and capital control policies in developed and developing countries. These issues
Figure 28. The release of USDA report ‘World Agricultural Supply and Demand
Estimates’ on 9 May 2014 at 12.00 p.m. US time (data for 5 minute intervals)
Source: Bloomberg.
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might be too much to tackle in a single paper but could be the subjects of a PhD thesis
or a comprehensive research project. The findings of such a work would have quite
valuable implications for the environmental policy issues.18
To conclude, this is an inspiring paper, which asks an important question and has
striking findings. There is substantial information for policymakers. However, my
view is that further work is needed on the subject. On the empirical front, the struc-
tural models on the issue could be enriched to include macroeconomic factors and
could allow for a two way contemporaneous relationship between the prices of food
and oil. As future work, it would also be interesting to carry out event studies to ana-
lyse the impacts of news on biofuel policies or market specific events on prices of vari-
ous commodities including oil. Besides, policy simulations under a suitable theoretical
framework would be extremely useful in order to create policy recommendations for
the future.
Panel discussion
Georges de Menil asked about the relation of the paper with changes in ethanol
requirements and the supply of agricultural land available for corn used in food pro-
duction. Michalis Haliassos wondered whether the authors could make use of changes
in the minimum requirements of ethanol content in gasoline to trace the effect on food
prices. Replying to discussants and comments, Lutz Kilian addressed the problem of
endogeneity of the real price of food. He explained that this was not a major issue,
pointing out that the share of food in the CPI is so small that there cannot be any bias.
In response to the suggestion to use different countries for the analysis, he added that
this sounds like a good idea at first but that suitable data for countries other than the
US are not readily available.
DATA APPENDIX
The nominal price of crude oil is obtained from the Monthly Energy Review of the US
Energy Information Administration. We follow the literature in using the US refiners’
acquisition cost for crude oil imports as a proxy for the global price of oil. The same
source also provides the US refiners’ price of No. 2 diesel fuel to end users excluding
taxes.
18 The data required for the direct estimation of such a two-country model may not exist currently, hence,
the model parameters may need to be calibrated and a detailed sensitivity analysis may need to be carried
out for unknown parameters.
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All consumer price index (CPI) and producer price index (PPI) data are obtained
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The aggregate and disaggregate indices refer to
prices paid by all urban consumers and are seasonally adjusted.
Monthly prices received by US farmers for corn, wheat, soybeans, rice, cattle, hogs,
live broiler, and live turkey are provided by the US Department of Agriculture, which
also makes available indices of the cost of fuel, fertilizer and animal feed paid by US
farmers. Additional monthly price data for farm inputs issued at quarterly frequency
were obtained from the National Agricultural Statistics Service for January 1988 to
October 1995.
The international CPI data were obtained from Eurostat, Statistics Canada, and
the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. All global commodity
prices are from the International Financial Statistics of the IMF.
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